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INORITY voters across the country are pressing for increased
political representation. In no area is this phenomenon more
true than in state judicial elections. After years of debate and
development, the United States Supreme Court has finally determined
that the Voting Rights Act does apply to judicial elections. Conse-
quently, minority voters have begun to challenge existing state electoral
systems as violative of the Voting Rights Act. Even if plaintiffs in these
cases can establish a violation of the Voting Rights Act, the question of
the appropriate remedy still remains. In this manner, the game of judicial
roulette - how to best select our judges - has already begun.
The most commonly suggested remedy is the implementation of single-
member districts. However, for a variety of reasons, such a plan may not
be the most beneficial relief, even for the minority plaintiffs. Cumulative
voting, merit selection, and non-partisan elections each may have advan-
tages over single-member districts as a solution to voting-rights chal-
lenges to judicial elections.
Part I of this Comment will explore the current status of the minority
underrepresentation problem. Part II will address the development of
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the Voting Rights Act in response to this quandary. Part III will examine
the potential impact of implementing a single-member-district remedy.
Finally, Part IV will analyze potential solutions to these voting-rights
challenges, excluding single-member districts.
I. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE
UNDERREPRESENTATION PROBLEM
Most states today use a version of an at-large voting system.' An at-
large election is one in which voters elect more than one candidate for the
same type of office in a multimember government body.2 An at-large
judicial election is one in which voters elect all the judges that serve on
the bench in a given jurisdiction.3 "Such at-large systems create a possi-
bility that the votes of a racial minority will be cancelled out by a white
majority that votes as a bloc."'4 The United States Supreme Court has
recognized that "[a]t-large voting schemes and multimember districts
tend to minimize the voting strength of minority groups by permitting the
political majority to elect all representatives of the district." 5
The statistics support such a conclusion. According to a 1985 study,
7,544 judges were elected to serve on major state courts. 6 Of these, only
238 were African-American. 7 That figure represents barely over three
percent of all elected judges. A 1986 study indicated that of the fifteen
states that elected judges to positions on their highest courts, ten had no
1. See Mary T. Wickham, Note, Mapping the Morass: Application of Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act to Judicial Elections, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1251, 1252 (1992) (citing
Dixie K. Knoebel, The Voting Rights Act: Are Its Provisions Applicable to the Judiciary?,
13 STATE CT. J., Summer 1989, at 27). Thirty-eight states elect either appellate or general
jurisdiction trial court judges. Knoebel, supra at 24, 26. The following states elect at least
some of their judges in multijudge, at-large elections: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkan-
sas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisi-
ana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming. Id. at 27.
2. Richard Saks, Note, Redemption or Exemption?: Racial Discrimination in Judicial
Elections Under the Voting Rights Act, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 245, 246 (1990).
3. Id.
4. Id. The existence of a bias against African-American candidates on the part of
white voters has been the subject of much research. "[T]he social science literature indi-
cates that race impacts most white decisionmaking most of the time, and ... unconscious
discrimination may be even more prevalent than the studies acknowledge." Barbara J.
Flag, Was Blind, But Now I See: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Dis-
criminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 985 (1993).
5. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616 (1982). Challenges to at-large systems for vari-
ous local governing bodies have eliminated at-large elections and produced a dramatic
increase in the number of minority elected officials on local school boards, city councils,
and county commissions. Saks, supra note 2, at 246. Between 1977 and 1987, the number
of local African-American elected officials increased from approximately 3,500 to 5,500.
Id.
6. Wickham, supra note 1, at 1276 (citing FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, INC., THE





African-Americans sitting on the high bench.8 In Texas, less than two
percent of elected judges are AfricaniAmerican. 9 In Louisiana, less than
three percent of elected judges are African-American.' 0 A 1990 study in
Florida found that only five minority judges, of 630 elected judges, at-
tained their positions on the circuit or county courts in at-large elec-
tions.11 "[A]rguably the most prevalent electoral procedure that
capitalizes on racial prejudices, and perpetuates the historical legacy of
racial discrimination in voting, is the at-large electoral district.' 12
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
The Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
the denial or abridgement of a citizen's right to vote based on race or
color by the United States or by any state.13 Historically, however, this
Amendment was never enforced. Instead, states were given great defer-
ence with regard to their electoral methods because of the Tenth Amend-
ment, which allows each state to determine its own electoral systems,
voter qualifications, and government structure.' 4
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was intended to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment.' 5 "The failure of prior civil rights legislation and case-by-
case litigation during the 1950's and early 1960's convinced Congress that
the stringent measures proposed in the Act were essential to dismantle
racial barriers in the American political system, particularly those existing
in the Southern states.' 6
"Underscoring the comprehensive intent of Congress is section
14(c)(1) of the Act, which defines vote and voting for purposes of the Act
and outlines the types of practices and elections that are embraced by the
Act's regulatory provisions."'1 7 Section 14(c)(1) states:
The terms "vote" and "voting" shall include all action necessary to
make a vote effective in any primary, special, or general election,
including, but not limited to, registration, listing pursuant to this sub-
8. Barbara L. Graham, Judicial Recruitment and Racial Diversity on State Courts: An
Overview, 74 JUDICATURE 28, 30 (1990). In 1986, no blacks were on the highest state
courts in 30 states, including ten that elect their judges: Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia. Id. The
following states each had one black justice on their highest bench: Alabama, California,
Florida, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, and Virginia. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Brenda Wright, The Bench and The Ballot: Applying the Protections of the Voting
Rights Act to Judicial Elections, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 669, 672 (1991) (citing CENTER FOR
GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY, UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA, RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVER-
SITY OF THE FLORIDA JUSTICE SYSTEM pt. 2, at 21-22 (1990) (study commissioned by the
Fla. Sup. Ct. Racial and Ethnic Bias Study Comm'n)).
12. Saks, supra note 2, at 252.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
15. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 383 (1991).
16. Saks, supra note 2, at 251.
17. Id. at 273.
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chapter, or other action required by law prerequisite to voting, cast-
ing a ballot, and having such ballot counted properly and included in
the appropriate totals of votes cast with respect to candidates for
public or party office and propositions for which votes are received
in an election.' 8
However, as originally enacted, the Voting Rights Act did not affect
existing electoral systems that diluted minority voting strength unless the
plaintiffs could show that they were adopted with discriminatory intent. 19
The Supreme Court eased this burden by reading the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit minority vote dilu-
tion.20 Instead of the intent requirement, the White Court adopted a to-
tality of the circumstances approach to plaintiffs' burden.21 The Court
held that:
[P]laintiffs' burden is to produce evidence to support findings that
the political processes leading to nomination and election were not
equally open to participation by the group in question - that its
members had less opportunity than did other residents in the district
to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of
their choice.22
The Fifth Circuit refined this standard in Zimmer v. McKeithen.23 Tak-
ing White with Zimmer, plaintiffs were merely required to present evi-
dence that the challenged electoral system had a discriminatory effect on
minority voting strength.24 However, this "effects" test lasted only seven
years. The Supreme Court in Mobile v. Bolden held that White requires
proof of discriminatory intent.25 The Mobile decision prompted Congress
to amend the Voting Rights Act in 198226 to reinstate the pre-Mobile
effects test.
The Senate report which accompanied the amendments outlined
three principal reasons why the intent test was repudiated. First, the
intent test was "unnecessarily divisive" because it forced minority
groups to prove that local or state officials were purposefully racist.
Second, plaintiffs had to bear an "inordinately difficult" burden of
proof that the defendant jurisdiction acted in a purposefully racist
manner. Third, it "ask[ed] the wrong question. '27
In other words, the intent test focused on the defendant jurisdiction,
rather than the rights of the minority voter.28 Specifically, the Senate
18. Voting Right Act of 1965, § 14(c)(1), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c)(1) (1994).
19. See Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
20. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-67 (1973).
21. Id. at 766. Thus, minority voters had to show that, in the totality of the circum-
stances, they had less opportunity than others to participate in the political processes. Id.
22. Id. (citing Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149-50 (1971)).
23. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. East
Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (per curiam).
24. See Philip P. Frickey, Majority Rule, Minority Rights, and the Right to Vote: Reflec-
tions Upon a Reading of MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, 3 LAW & INEQ. J. 209, 213 (1985).
25. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65-74 (1980).
26. Thornburg v. Gingles; 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986).




report stated that the correct inquiry, considering the purpose of the Act
and the doctrine of minority vote dilution, is whether "as a result of the
challenged practice or structure plaintiffs do not have an equal opportu-
nity to participate in the electoral process and to elect candidates of their
choice." 29
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act now prohibits existing electoral laws
that, when combined with racial bloc voting,30 tend to dilute minority
votes. 31 Specifically, subsection 2(a) follows the language of the Fifteenth
Amendment in prohibiting voting laws that result in the "abridgement of
the right to vote on account of race or color."'32 Subsection 2(b) defines a
violation of subsection 2(a) to include circumstances in which "members
[of a minority group] have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representa-
tives of their choice. '33
"The importance of the 1982 amendments to the development of the
concept of minority vote dilution cannot be overstated. '34
The effect of the amendments in lightening plaintiffs' burden of
proof was often decisive in making a minority vote dilution case via-
ble. Flagrant abuses of the right-to-vote such as literacy tests, regis-
tration requirements, and poll taxes in the Southern states of the old
29. Id. at 270 (citing S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28, reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 417).
30. The Thornburg opinion defines racial bloc voting: "Stated succinctly, a bloc voting
majority must usually be able to defeat candidates supported by a politically cohesive,
geographically insular minority group." Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 48-49.
31. Id. at 45-46.
32. Subsection 2(a) provides that:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or pro-
cedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of
the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of
the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in
subsection (b) of this section.
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
33. Subsection 2(b) provides that:
A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the
totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading
to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally
open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsec-
tion (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected
class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one
circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this sec-
tion establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in num-
bers equal to their proportion in the population.
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
34. Saks, supra note 2, at 259.
The impact of the 1982 amendments is revealed by the following statistics. In
the three years prior to the passage of the 1982 amendments of Section 2, less
than six hundred jurisdictions altered their electoral procedures. However,
in the three years after the amendments were passed, the number dramati-
cally increased to 1,354.
Id. at 260 n.75.
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Confederacy were the principal targets of the Act in 1965. The Act
did abolish such abuses and secure the formal right-to-vote for Afri-
can-Americans in the South. However, minority vote dilution - re-
sulting mainly from multi-member districts - remained as a subtle,
but effective, barrier to minority political participation at the munici-
pal, county, and state levels of government in every region of the
country. 35
Thus, as it now stands, the Voting Rights Act has two major branches.
Section 2 prohibits states from maintaining existing electoral systems that
dilute minority voting strength. 36 Section 5 prohibits dilutive or discrimi-
natory changes in a state's electoral system. 37 Under this provision, "cov-
ered" jurisdictions must inform the Attorney General or the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia of changes they plan in
their electoral system.38 If the court or the Attorney General finds that
the changes have a discriminatory purpose or effect, they may prevent the
implementation of the plans.39
Following the 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act, federal cir-
cuits were split on whether Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act applies to
judicial elections as well as to legislative and executive elections. 40 Im-
portant to this debate was a difference between the language of the White
opinion and amended subsection 2(b). Congress changed the phrase "op-
portunity to elect legislators" to "opportunity to elect representatives."
The Supreme Court noted the new term and held that Section 2 does
apply to judicial elections.41 Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that
Section 5 also applies to judicial elections. 42
In spite of this recognition of the applicability of Section 2 protections
to judicial elections, the Supreme Court did not discuss the problem of
available remedies. This question regarding the proper remedy remains
35. Id. at 259.
36. In addition to vote dilution, Section 2 "prohibits all forms of voting discrimina-
tion." Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 45 n.10 (1986) (citing S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
30 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 207).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994).
38. Covered jurisdictions are those districts that (1) maintained any test or device on
November 1, 1964, November 1, 1968, or November 1, 1972, or (2) had less than 50% of
voting age residents either vote or register to vote in the 1964, 1968, or 1972 presidential
elections. In practice, almost all covered jurisdictions seek preclearance from the Attorney
General rather than from the district court. See Hiroshi Motomura, Preclearance Under
Section Five of the Voting Rights Act, 61 N.C. L. REV. 189, 191 (1983) (describing the "ex-
pense and delay" of declaratory judgment actions which usually lead covered jurisdictions
to obtain preclearance from the Attorney General for changes affecting voting).
39. 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.1, 51.10 (1990). The burden is on the covered jurisdiction to prove
the nondiscriminatory nature of any changes. See Motomura, supra note 38, at 245.
40. Compare League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir.
1990) (en banc) (holding that § 2 does not apply to judicial elections), rev'd sub nor.
Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen. of Texas, 501 U.S. 419 (1991) with Mallory v.
Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that § 2 does apply to judicial elections).
41. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991).




as minority voters have begun to use Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
to challenge judicial elections.43
III. PROBLEMS WITH SINGLE-MEMBER DISTRICTS
Assuming that plaintiffs do establish a violation of the Voting Rights
Act, what remedy should the court order? The electoral plan most com-
monly suggested is that of subdistricting, or single-member districts. Sub-
districting is the splitting of at-large electoral districts into smaller
subdistricts. 44 The process works by dividing an at-large electoral district
into several single-member subdistricts.45 Some of the subdistricts are
drawn to ensure that the population of racial or ethnic minority groups in
these districts is large enough to permit minority voters to elect their pre-
ferred candidates. These subdistricts are called "safe" districts.46
However, in spite of the apparent preference given to this system by
courts and politicians, single-member districts have many faults. More-
over, single-member districts may not be in the best interests of minority'
voters, even though these are the people whom such new electoral plans
were intended to benefit the most. First, single-member-district plans
have failed to mobilize sustained voter participation. Typically, voter
turnout increases "in response to initial election opportunities for candi-
dates of the minority community's choice";47 however, mobilization ef-
forts for these first-time elections are generally not repeated.
Consequently, turnout tends to decline "in subsequent elections after the
first black pioneer becomes the incumbent. '48
Additionally, because these districts are drawn by incumbent politi-
cians seeking to protect their own self-interests, there is a sense that voter
preference has been pre-determined by the legislature. 49 Consequently,
minority voters may lose interest in these elections.50
43. See League of United Latin American Citizens y. Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir.
1990) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen. of Texas, 501
U.S. 419, (1991); Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
955 (1988); Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1988); Clark v. Roemer, 750 F. Supp.
200 (M.D. La. 1990), vacated and remanded, 501 U.S. 1246 (1990); Brooks v. Georgia State
Bd. of Elections, 848 F. Supp. 1548 (S.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd, 498 U.S. 916, (1990); Southern
Christian Leadership Conference of Alabama v. Siegelman, 714 F. Supp. 511 (M.D. Ala.
1989); Martin v. Mabus, 700 F. Supp. 327 (S.D. Miss. 1988); Williams v. State Bd. of Elec-
tions, 696 F. Supp. 1563 (N.D. III. 1986). "Minority voters attribute the exclusion of minor-
ity judges to the discriminatory impact of at-large judicial elections." Saks, supra note 2, at
246. "In at least eight states, minority voters have challenged the legality of at-large judi-
cial elections, contending that such electoral schemes violate the [Voting Rights] Act." Id.




47. Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests: The Question of Single-
Member Districts, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1135, 1156 (1993).
48. Id. at 1157.
49. Id. at 1157-58.
50. Id. at 1158. ("Incumbents usually enjoy tremendous power over the districting
process, through which they frequently attempt to create safe districts to make their reelec-
tion margins even more comfortable. Within the legislature, redistricting battles are often
19951
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Another problem with single-member districts is that they rely on sub-
stantial residential segregation to be effective. For example, if the His-
panic population of a given city is dispersed throughout the jurisdiction,
districting does not accurately reflect either the real or potential power of
that Hispanic community.51 Furthermore, in a jurisdiction with a com-
plex mix of racial, ethnic, and linguistic characteristics, the redistricting
struggle may result in conflict between African Americans and other mi-
nority voters. 52 "These groups may compete over how many minority
districts should be created, and who should control them. Each group is
encouraged to assert its superior moral, historic, and pragmatic claim. In
the lottery of competing oppression, no one wins." '53
Additionally, single-member districts underrepresent minority voters,
even when race-conscious, "safe" districts are created.54 Minority voters
will not enjoy truly proportional representation in a single-member dis-
trict system unless their residences are concentrated in the correct man-
ner, perfectly within the confines of the safe district created for those
minority voters.55 This lack of proportional representation is evidenced
by the fact that African-Americans "are not proportionately represented
in any of the southern legislatures, even after a decade of race-conscious
districting. 56
Single-member districts have also been criticized for denying minority
voters meaningful participation in the electoral process.5 7 Because the
districts are drawn by the legislature, voters are not directly involved in
the districting process. Instead, "voters' interests are presumed to be rep-
resented by their indirect, preexisting choice of residence. '58
Furthermore, single-member-district systems assume that even where
voters' true interests are not directly represented by the victorious candi-
date in their district, the winner will indirectly represent those interests.5 9
This concept is known as virtual representation. Virtual representation
presumes that the electoral "winners. will represent the [interests of the
losers] or that losers may experience defeat in one district," but winners
pitched without regard to issues of community interests or voter representation .... To
maximize their chance of re-election, those in control of districting may promote noncom-
petitive election contests which further reduce voter participation and interest."). This
problem is closely associated with the flaws of virtual representation, discussed infra.
51. Guinier, supra note 47, at 1159.
52. Id.
53. Id. (citing Larry Rohter, A Black-Hispanic Struggle Over Florida Redistricting,
N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1992, at A6 (stating that a large Hispanic population and other fast-
growing minority groups are laying claim "to the same rights provided to blacks under the
Voting Rights Act.")).
54. Guinier, supra note 47, at 1159.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1159-60 (citing REIN TAGEPERA & MATTHEW SOBERO SHUGART, SEATS
AND VOTES: THE EFFECTS AND DETERMINANTS OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS (1989) and Ed-
ward R. Tufte, The Relationship Between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems, 67 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 540 (1973)).





in another district will still represent them.6° "The Supreme Court in Da-
vis v. Bandemer, Gaffney v. Cummings, and UJO v. Carey endorsed this
concept. '61
However, commentators believe that virtual representation conflicts
with the concept of empowerment: 62
The process of physically confecting districts, which may be accom-
panied by extensive but perfunctory public hearings, is one domi-
nated by incumbent self-interest and court-appointed experts with
no particular ties to grass roots concerns. By removing the issue
from the voter, the districting process is antithetical to empowerment
strategies based on voter participation and voter choice.63
Single-member districts have also been attacked as promoting dishar-
mony amongst various racial groups. For example, during the 1981 con-
gressional reapportionment in Georgia, a plan introduced by Senator
Julian Bond creating a sixty-nine percent African-American fifth congres-
sional district was criticized because it "would disrupt the 'harmonious
working relationship between the races' and would cause polarization
and 'white flight.' "64
However, some empirical evidence contradicts this criticism.
The available evidence, while not extensive, supports the conclusion
that effective minority voting districts do not create racial isolation
or disserve the interests of racial minorities. Existing social science
data confirm what common sense and the anecdotal evidence indi-
cate - that the increased minority office holding associated with sin-
gle member districts has also been associated with a substantial shift
in responsiveness to minority interests and the inclusion of minorities
in decisionmaking. 65
Furthermore, studies in California and Alabama have found causal re-
lationships between increased minority representation achieved through
single-member districts and tangible policy changes.66 Indeed, this in-
creased minority political representation directly furthered congressional
support for the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act. 67 Further-
more, commentators argue that "increased minority office holding en-
hances ethnic pride and dignity, underscores the legitimacy of elected
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Guinier, supra note 47, at 1160.
63. Id. at 1161.
64. Laughlin McDonald, The Quiet Revolution in Minority Voting Rights, 42 VAND. L.
REV. 1250, 1274 (1989) (quoting Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 507 (D.D.C. 1982)).
65. McDonald, supra note 64, at 1276-77 (citing Morris, Black Electoral Participation
and the Distribution of Public Benefits, in THE RIGHT TO VOTE 164, 180 (Rockefeller
Found. 1981)).
66. McDonald, supra note 64, at 1277 (citing R. BROWNING, D. MARSHALL, & D.
TABB, PROTEST iS NOT ENOUGH 168 (1984) and Hamilton, Political Access, Minority Par-
ticipation, and the New Normalcy, in MINORITY REPORT 12 (L. Dunbar ed., 1984)).
67. McDonald, supra note 64, at 1278.
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government, and is a visible sign that public office is not reserved for
whites only."'68
Some critics of single-member districts, however, would not deny the
many benefits of increased minority representation in the political pro-
cess. They would simply take issue with the stance that single-member
districts are the best way to provide that representation.
Other criticisms of single-member districts are common. For example,
single-member districts have also been criticized for having "failed to fos-
ter genuine, accountable debate about political issues."' 69 Specifically, in
the winner-take-all system, whereby the candidate who surpasses fifty
percent of the votes gains all of the political power, candidates rush to the
center of the political spectrum where most of the votes are located. 70
Since the "focus [is] on developing consensus prior to the election * . *
issues are frequently not fully articulated or debated." Conversely, posi-
tions on controversial topics are often avoided and replaced by watered-
down, meaningless statements "designed to offend no one."'71
Furthermore, by promoting only two real choices between one candi-
date or another, winner-take-all, single-member-district plans create a
negative campaigning environment.72 Negative campaign strategies, in
turn, contribute to voter apathy and alienation.73 Such negative cam-
paign tactics, which help create an unfavorable opinion of all politicians,
have been linked to the suggestion of term limits. 74 "Term limits repre-
sent voter discontent with the class of professional politicians who will do
anything just to get reelected but, apart from election day, have essen-
tially lost touch with their constituency." 75
68. Id. at 1277 n.159 (citing A. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT?: AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION AND MINORITY VOTINO RIGHTS 239-40 (1987)).
69. Guinier, supra note 47, at 1161.
70. Id.
71. Id. Guinier goes on to explain how:
[Slome candidates avoid discussing issues at all, relying on advertising agen-
cies to sell their candidacies the way they sell products. For example, the
largest winner-take-all single member district is the one for the United States
Presidency. In 1992, President Bush had planned to mirror the Republican
advertising strategy for the 1984 race. In that race, his media group associ-
ated Ronald Reagan with "a swell of violins and a cloud of sentimental pic-
tures," completely shunning issue-oriented advertising for "its morning in
America" theme.
Id. at 1161 n.90 (quoting Michael Wines, Bush's Campaign Tries Madison Ave., N.Y.
TIMES, May 27, 1992, at A18).
72. Guinier, supra note 47, at 1161 (explaining that in a two-way race, one candidate
can use negative campaigning to discredit the other candidate without any fear that af-
fected voters will turn to an untarnished third candidate).
73. Guinier, supra note 47, at 1161-62 (citing Elizabeth Kolbert, Senate Races Marked
by Vivid Images, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1992, at A18 (stating that "candidates in a California
primary were searching for strong insults to lodge against opponents in order to make their
campaign commercials stand out; this practice met the usual stereotypes of candidates that
they will do anything for votes without saying anything of substance.")).
74. Guinier, supra note 47, at 1162.
75. Id. (citing Elizabeth Kolbert, Campaign in California: Little But Commercials,
N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1992, at Al (describing new campaign tactics in which candidates sell
themselves exclusively as a product via television commercials)).
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Perhaps the most significant criticism of single-member districts, how-
ever, is that such a system promotes only tokenism, not true political
power.76 A natural consequence of concentrating politically-cohesive mi-
nority voters in a single district is that nonminority voters will also be
concentrated in the remaining districts.77 Each district is intentionally
drawn so as to maximize racial differences between voters in those dis-
tricts;78 consequently, racial segregation will create political segrega-
tion.79 "White candidates will have no political incentive to respond to
minority needs, because they will not be responsible in any way to minor-
ity voters at the polls."80
Race-conscious districting creates other problems. For instance, it iso-
lates African-Americans from potential political allies, such as white wo-
men, who are not geographically concentrated. 81 Furthermore, single-
member-districting systems in effect waste the votes of white liberals who
may be placed in white, conservative districts.82 In this manner, single-
member districts may suppress the potential development of issue-based
campaigns and cross-racial political coalitions.8 3 Thus, this political seg-
regation may actually hinder minorities' efforts to effect substantive pol-
icy changes. s4 While in all likelihood, single-member districts would
increase the number of minority members on state courts,8 5 the purpose
76. See Guinier, supra note 47, at 1162 (arguing that while "symbolic representation is
important even where it does not insure accountability and influence," having the real
political power necessary to actually influence substantive policy changes should be the
goal of minority voters).
77. James S. McClain, Note, The Voting Rights Act and Local School Boards: An Ar-
gument for Deference to Educational Policy in Remedies for Vote Dilution, 67 TEX. L. REv.
139, 150 (1988).
78. This alludes to yet another byproduct of a single-member-districting plan: the re-
sulting fierce political battles over the actual drawing of the district lines. These political
wars can rage on for years, throwing jurisdictions into a state of political confusion and
uncertainty.
79. McClain, supra note 77, at 150-51.
80. Id. at 151; see also Guinier, supra note 47, at 1162-63:
Because majority black districts free black candidates from electoral compe-
tition from whites, white legislators may enjoy electoral success in white dis-
tricts that are not dependent on black votes. For this reason, some
conservative critics of race-conscious districting argue that majority minority
districts quarantine poor blacks in inner-city ghettos. For example, critics of
newly drawn black districts claim that the districts ultimately benefit white
Republicans .... The direct consequence of majority black districts is that
fewer white legislators are directly accountable to black interests.
81. Guinier, supra note 47, at 1163.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See also Guinier, supra note 47, at 1163 ("In these ways, race-conscious districting
may not ensure that blacks enjoy proportional legislative influence. Because majority
black districts are necessarily accompanied by majority white districts, black representa-
tives may become isolated in the governing body."). However, as stated previously, some
studies come to the opposite conclusion. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
85. Wickham, supra note 1, at 1282 (citing Marcia Coyle, The Justices Rule on Judges,
NAT'L L.J., July 1, 1991, at 1).
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of the Voting Rights Act is to protect minority voters, not minority
candidates. 86
Another possible impact of instituting a single-member-district electo-
ral system is that judges may become dependent on special interests.
In subdivided judicial districts, the risks of overpoliticization are
clear. The smaller the group a judge serves, the greater the likeli-
hood that constituents will expect a judge to be responsive to their
special needs. Danger exists that the focus may move away from
qualifications, integrity, and experience 87 and toward an attitude of
"what can this judge do for me.". When voters hold such an attitude,
even the most conscientious judges may be tempted to bow to con-
stituent pressures. Multimember judicial districts can provide a
buffer that mitigates the accountability of each judge to a particular
constituent group. In single-member districting, however, that buffer
is destroyed.88
However, in spite of this theoretical concern, judicial observers in Missis-
sippi, the first state where single-member districts were ordered as a legal
remedy, have not noted any threats to the independence of the state judi-
ciary or other detrimental consequences from the use of single-member
districts.89
Nevertheless, because of all of these concerns regarding the impact of
instituting a single-member-district system, race-conscious districting may
not be the best available remedy to victims of the Voting Rights Act vio-
lations. At the very least, such a plan will be politically unpopular and
thus difficult to implement. 90 Furthermore, as shown above, even though
single-member districts would probably increase the number of minority
judges, it is not at all clear that such symbolic representation is in the best
interests of minority voters. If a single-member-district system is not the
best remedy, however, the question as to what is still remains open for
debate.
Any proposed alternative must ideally meet two requirements. First, it
must increase the representation provided to minority voters. In this re-
gard, true, substantive representation, providing the ability to influence
actual policy decisions, would best serve minority voters.
86. Id.
87. The validity of the assumption contained in this argument (i.e., that the current
focus of judicial elections is on qualifications, integrity, and experience) is not at all clear.
Rather, extensive evidence supports the argument that the focus of judicial elections is not
on the qualifications, integrity, and experience of the candidates but their political party
affiliation. See discussion of non-partisan elections, infra part IV.C.
88. Wickham, supra note 1, at 1281-82 (citing Katherine I. Butler, The Bench and the
Ballot Box, FULTON Co. DAILY REP., Nov. 4, 1991, at 6-7).
89. See Clark v. Roemer, 777 F. Supp. 471, 477 (M.D. La. 1991) (citing testimony of ajudge elected in 1990 from a black majority subdistrict in Hinds County, Mississippi and of
a white trial lawyer in a large firm in Jackson, Mississippi).
90. The plan would be unpopular to white majority voters who often react negatively
to any threat of changing the status quo. While such caution is insufficient to justify imped-
ing progress, it nevertheless remains a realistic political obstacle.
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Second, if possible, any proposed alternative should be politically ac-
ceptable. Changing a state's electoral system will at the very least require
state legislative action, if not a state constitutional amendment. There-
fore, taking into account political realities and finding a remedy that is
politically acceptable would increase the potential effectiveness of any
proposed alternative to single-member districts as a solution to voting-
rights challenges. The remainder of this Comment will discuss several
possible alternative remedies with these two suggested conditions in
mind.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO VOTING-RIGHTS
CHALLENGES OTHER THAN SINGLE-MEMBER
DISTRICTS
A. CUMULATIVE VOTING
A cumulative voting system is one possible alternative to single-mem-
ber districts as a solution to voting-rights challenges to at-large judicial
elections. Voters in such a system have a predetermined number 9' of
votes to distribute among the available candidates. 92 Voters are free to
distribute their votes however they like, and the candidates receiving the
most votes win.93 Thus, by casting more than one vote for a single candi-
date, voters in a given election are able to express the relative strength of
their preferences among the candidates. 94
The advantages to a cumulative voting system are numerous. First,
each voter in such a system has the ability to influence the electoral suc-
cess or failure of every representative. 95 In contrast, in a single-member-
district system, voters have the ability to influence only the representative
chosen in their particular district.
Cumulative voting ... allows interest groups to plan strategically
to maximize their representation. Each group can estimate its
strength, determine the number of candidates it can elect, and in-
struct its members how best to vote in order to elect the group's
candidates. If all groups follow this course, representation will ap-
proximate each group's share of the electorate.96
91. Usually, the number of votes given to each voter in a cumulative voting system is
equal to the number of candidates to be elected. For example, if twelve judges were to be
elected, each voter would receive twelve votes. Each individual voter could then distribute
those votes however he or she wished. See Note, Alternative Voting Systems as Remedies
for Unlawful At-Large Systems, 92 YALE L. 144, 153 (1982) [hereinafter Alternative Vot-
ing Systems].
92. Id.
93. Id. The number of votes required for a candidate to win an election held under a
cumulative voting system if all remaining votes are cast in the way most unfavorable to her
is given by the formula: NV/(S+1)+I, where N is the number of voters; V is the number of
available votes given to each voter to cast; and S is the number of seats to be filled in the
election. Id. at 153 n.41.





Obviously, one possible drawback with such a system is the potential
danger of miscalculation on the part of these interest groups:
For representation to be roughly proportional, each group must cor-
rectly estimate its strength, run the number of candidates that its
strength can support, and instruct its members how best to distribute
their votes over the group's candidates. If the group fails in any of
these steps or its members fail to follow their directions, under-
representation of that group can follow. For example, if a group
overestimates its strength or for other reasons runs too many candi-
dates, it may spread its votes too thinly to elect any of its candidates.
If, on the other hand, it underestimates its strength or for other rea-
sons runs too few candidates, it will elect less than its proportionate
share of representatives. 97
In spite of this potential drawback, the advantages of cumulative voting
are provocative. Specifically, a cumulative voting system would tangibly
benefit minority voters. "Since voters can cast all their votes for a single
candidate, success depends not only on the breadth but also on the depth
of a candidate's support."98 This characteristic would aid highly cohesive
groups, such as racial minorities, that are underrepresented in traditional
voting systems that have strong majoritarian biases, such as at-large
elections. 99
Most importantly in terms of comparison, cumulative voting avoids
some of the potential disadvantages of single-member districts. First, rep-
resentatives from a multimember district, such as the winners elected
under a cumulative voting system, are less susceptible to being controlled
by special interests. 1°° Because each candidate for office must campaign
in the entire district, not just some carved-up portion therein, there is less
political advantage to becoming identified with one particular special-in-
terest group.' 0 '
Furthermore, cumulative voting would leave intact the basic structure
of the existing form of government. 10 2 In other words, the district would
remain the same; only the method of election would change. On the
other hand, in a single-member-district system, the existing district would
be discarded in favor of smaller sub-districts. In this manner, cumulative
voting may be a "less drastic remedy for discriminatory at-large
systems.' 10 3
Cumulative voting also increases the chances of minority voters achiev-
ing actual, substantive representation, as opposed to the virtual represen-
tation discussed previously in the context of single-member districts.' °4
This achievement of actual representation "increases individuals' percep-
97. Id. at 153 n.44.
98. Alternative Voting Systems, supra note 91, at 154.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 155.
101. Id.
102. Id.




tion of participation in the political process and reduces feelings of aliena-
tion and powerlessness.' 10 5
Further advantages to cumulative voting, as compared to single-mem-
ber districts, are associated with residential segregation and race rela-
tions. For example, cumulative voting reduces the pressure toward
residential segregation that might occur as a result of voter preference for
actual representation. Under this system individual voters need not move
to a safe district to obtain actual representation. 1 6 Last, cumulative vot-
ing may not exacerbate racial tensions since no group receives special
treatment' 0 7 at the expense of other voter groups. 108
However, as with the implementation of almost any political change,
cumulative voting produces several potential disadvantages. First and
foremost, as a relatively unknown system' 0 9 that is more complex than
most electoral systems currently in use, cumulative voting may face an
initial reluctance on the part of potential voters, as well as the politicians
needed to pass such a plan.110 In this manner, cumulative voting may not
meet the goal of political viability.
Furthermore, some commentators argue that the relative complexity of
cumulative voting might "present special problems to members of minor-
ity groups, who are often less familiar with the voting process and tend to
have a less formal education.""' Actual experience, however, indicates
that most voters can understand cumulative voting." 2
Another objection to cumulative voting is that campaigns for office in a
multimember district are much more expensive than those for office in a
single-member district." 3 "Increasing the size of the electorate increases
the campaign expenses.""14 Since minority candidates often have less
money than do their white opponents," 5 cumulative voting may produce
105. Id. (citing inter alia United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 178 (1977) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in part) (noting dissatisfaction of white community with virtual repre-
sentation) and C. PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 43 (1970)
(arguing that participation leads one to feel part of the community and accept collective
decisions)).
106. Id. at 155.
107. Special treatment occurs in a single-member-district system in the sense that dis-
tricts are intentionally drawn for the purpose of ensuring that residents of that district will
be able to elect their favored candidate to office.
108. Alternative Voting Systems, supra note 91, at 155.
109. Before 1980, various jurisdictions in Illinois utilized cumulative voting. McDonald,
supra note 64, at 1284 n.195.
110. Self-interested politicians would be reluctant to implement a cumulative voting
system because they could not then "carve out" their own safe district, as they could under
a single-member-districting plan. Again, the interests of the voters far outweigh those of
the politicians. Nevertheless, the political reality is that the politicians may be reluctant to
adopt a cumulative voting system.
111. Alternative Voting Systems, supra note 91, at 155.
112. EDITH LAKEMAN, How DEMOCRACIES VOTE: A STUDY OF MAJORITY AND PRO-
PORTIONAL ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 155 (3d ed. 1970).
113. Alternative Voting Systems, supra note 91, at 156.
114. Id. (citing LAKEMAN, supra note 112, at 155).
115. Alternative Voting Systems, supra note 91, at 156.
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a disadvantage to minority candidates and thus inhibit the ability of mi-
nority voters to elect their preferred representatives. 16
Minorities and other cohesive groups, however, may not require as
much money as other groups to plan and run a successful campaign for
office under a cumulative voting system.117 "[M]embers of cohesive
groups will likely identify more directly and more immediately with their
group's candidates."'1 18
Thus, cumulative voting is one possible alternative to single-member
districts as a solution to voting rights challenges to at-large elections. Cu-
mulative voting presents several advantages over single-member districts,
yet, as with any system, drawbacks still exist.
B. MERIT SELECTION
Merit selection, usually entailing gubernatorial appointment of judges
from nominees submitted by a judicial nominating commission, emerged
in 1940 in Missouri as the reform alternative to judicial election.11 9 In the
last twenty-five years, many states have changed to a merit-selection sys-
tem for selection of judges. 120 "This shift to [merit-selection plans] has
resulted largely from the efforts of reform-minded people in the legal
community who view election as a highly flawed method for selecting
judges.' 121 A merit selection plan is one in which judges are appointed
rather than elected. Specifics of the merit selection plans vary. Some
have the governor make the appointment; others propose an independ-
ent, bi-partisan committee to be the decision-making body.
Even today, states are adopting the merit system, with recent changes
occurring in New Mexico and Connecticut. 22 Merit selection exists in
thirty-three states and the District of Columbia, although the states use it
in differing amounts in these jurisdictions. 123 "For example, thirteen
states and the District of Columbia choose all judges by merit plans; nine
states use the process for selecting some judges; and eleven employ it for
interim appointments only."'1 24
The Supreme Court itself has suggested merit selection as a possible
remedy for voting-rights violations: "Louisiana could, of course, exclude
its judiciary from the coverage of the Voting Rights Act by changing to a
116. "[Cjourts have considered this problem in at-large elections and have found that
the higher costs of running in a multimember district do not place an unconstitutional
burden on minority candidates." Id. at 156 n.55.
117. Alternative Voting Systems, supra note 91, at 156.
118. Id.
119. William M. Pearson & David S. Castle, Alternative Judicial Selection Devices: An
Analysis of Texas Judges' Attitudes, 73 JUDICATURE 34 (1989).
120. Lawrence Baum, Voters' Information in Judicial Elections: The 1986 Contests for
the Ohio Supreme Court, 77 Ky. L.J. 645 (1989).
121. Id. at 646.
122. Pearson & Castle, supra note 119, at 34.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 35.
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system in which judges are appointed."'1 25 Texas Supreme Court Chief
Justice Tom Phillips, in his 1989 "State of the Judiciary" address, "recom-
mended merit selection as a method of improving the judiciary and avoid-
ing a federal court order to draw judicial district lines in a manner so they
do not dilute minority voting strength." 126
There are three primary potential benefits to a merit-selection plan for
judges. First, such a plan could increase minority representation on the
bench. The appointing body, whether it be the governor or an independ-
ent committee, cognizant of the need for a judiciary representative of all
citizens, could ensure that qualified minorities are selected to serve as
judges.
The second potential benefit of a merit-selection plan is that it could, in
fact, produce better-qualified judges. Instead of electing judges based
primarily on name recognition and party affiliation, judges would be ap-
pointed based on their credentials as a prospective jurist. The decision of
how best to select judges is dependent on how we view our judges. "[I]f
judges themselves are viewed as having a special expertise in probing the
source's mind, elections would not be the preferred mode of selection;"
instead, expert executive appraisal would seem to be a better method for
evaluating the expertise of judicial aspirants. 127
The third potential benefit of a merit-selection system for choosing
judges is that it could de-politicize the judiciary. In other words, judges
would not have to act as politicians, constantly attempting to raise money
for their next campaign effort, often from the same attorneys appearing
before them in court on a daily basis. By appointing judges instead of
electing them, this appearance of impropriety is nullified.
This appearance of impropriety is well documented, especially in Texas.
"For example, in 1987, the [Texas] Commission on Judicial Conduct 'rep-
rimanded' Supreme Court Justice C.L. Ray and 'admonished' Supreme
Court Justice William Kilgarlin for ethics violations.'1 28 "The Commis-
sion found Ray to have, among other things, improperly requested the
transfer of two intermediate appellate cases involving Pat Maloney, who
had contributed $20,000 to Ray's most recent campaign.' 29 The Com-
mission's discovery made Governor Bill Clements ask the two justices to
resign, but the resignations were not tendered. 30 The result was "a
number of vigorous editorials in the Texas press calling for reform of
Texas' method of selecting its judges.' 31
125. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 401 (1991).
126. Pearson & Castle, supra note 119, at 35.
127. Michael H. Shapiro, Introduction, Judicial Selection and the Design of Clumsy In-
stitutions, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1555, 1566 (1988).
128. Pearson & Castle, supra note 119, at 36.
129. Stuart Banner, Disqualifying Elected Judges from Cases Involving Campaign Con-
tributors, 40 STAN. L. REV. 449, 451 (1988).
130. Id.
131. Id. In late August, Chief Justice John Hill resigned from office effective January 1,
1988, stating that he would lobby to adopt a non-partisan method of judicial selection for
Texas. Banner, supra note 129, at 490.
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"In 1988, CBS's show 60 Minutes aired a segment on the Texas judici-
ary, revealing campaign contributions to supreme court justices by law-
yers with cases pending before the court. The program's implication
[was] that judicial elections encourage a conflict of interest and affect
negatively the quality of judges. '132 Another example occurred in 1985
and involved the Pennzoil-Texaco litigation. 133 After learning that the
case had been "assigned to Texas District Court Judge Anthony J.P. Far-
ris, Pennzoil attorney Joseph D. Jamail promptly contributed $10,000 to
Farris's re-election campaign. ' 134 No research has been conducted on
whether these contributions actually influence the outcomes of cases. 135
The Chief Justice of the Nebraska Supreme Court, Norman Krivosha, has
commented on the appearance of impropriety: "How does a judge col-
lect campaign funds without creating the appearance of impropriety?
One may be the most ethical individual in the world and, yet, if one must
seek funds as the other two branches of government do when running for
office, one inevitably creates the appearance of impropriety.' '1 36
Nevertheless, in spite of this appearance of impropriety, "[s]tate
judges, particularly those on the supreme courts, are usually isolated from
lobbying efforts by a tradition of insulation and nominally principled
decisionmaking."'137 But supreme court judges cannot be fully insulated
from interest group pressure, and the judges may subconsciously favor
the interests of a particular group. "In the funding of judicial election
campaigns and other ways, interest groups can indirectly affect the direc-
tion of substantive law and choice of law."'1 38 Thus, the interest group
influence is really a matter of degree. "[W]hile surely not as great as that
exercised in the legislative or executive arena, interest groups can affect
the judicial process as well."'1 39 A former justice on the California
Supreme Court, Otto M. Kaus, has said, "There's no way a judge is going
to be able to ignore the political consequences of certain decisions, espe-
cially if he or she has to make them at election time. That would be like
ignoring a crocodile in your bathtub.' 40 Furthermore, this potential for
bias may be "both for and against the campaign contributor, as judges
may bend over backwards to avoid the appearance of bias.' 41 When
contributors are lawyers appearing before the receiving judge, special
problems arise. "It seems unlikely that a litigant who has contributed to
132. Pearson & Castle, supra note 119, at 36.
133. Banner, supra note 129, at 451.
134. Id.
135. Banner, supra note 129, at 463.
136. Id. (quoting Norman Krivosha, Acquiring Judges by the Merit Selection Method:
The Case for Adopting Such a Method, 40 Sw. U. 15, 19 (1986)).
137. Michael E. Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law, 24
GA. L. REV. 49, 72 (1989).
138. Id. at 73.
139. Id. at 74.
140. Robert S. Thompson, Judicial Retention Elections and Judicial Method: A Retro-
spective on the California Retention Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2007, 2057 (1988).
141. Banner, supra note 129, at 452.
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the judge before whom he is appearing would ever have done so unless
he wanted to influence the way his case would be decided." 142
A merit-selection plan, however, may very well increase the political
activity of those persons who wish to become judges. Especially if the
governor is the appointing body, there is a high risk that appointments
will turn into political favors. The potential is that judicial appointments
will merely be the prize for the person donating the most money to the
victorious gubernatorial candidate's campaign fund.
There are other potential drawbacks to a merit-selection system. First,
such a change in a state's election procedures, like all changes to election
procedures, would be subject to the preclearance requirements of Section
5 of the Voting Rights Act. 143 "[T]he House Judiciary Committee Report
that accompanies the 1982 amendment of Section 2 [of the Voting Rights
Act] specifically mentions 'shifts from elective to appointive office' as an
example of 'practices and procedures in the electoral process' that
[might] violate Section 2."'"1
Thus, jurisdictions that switch from an election system to a merit-selec-
tion plan would have to get approval from the United States Department
of Justice before eliminating their election system for judges. 145 Addi-
tionally, if a merit-selection system were instituted in response to litiga-
tion under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the jurisdiction would have
to "[explain] why such a change was made just when the election system
was about to be opened to meaningful participation by minority
voters."146
Furthermore, most merit-selection proposals include a retention elec-
tion component. 147 Under this plan, judges would be appointed by the
governor or an independent board but would then face an unopposed,
yes-or-no vote from the voters. The purpose of the retention election is
to preserve the democratic right of citizens to vote for their judges.
"[Jiudges tell us what to do, making moral decisions in the process, and
this puts autonomy and democracy at risk;"'148 however, to say that the
142. Banner, supra note 129, at 462-63.
This could happen by coincidence; a nonlawyer who contributes to the re-
election campaign of a local judge because he is 'tough on crime' could ap-
pear soon afterwards before the judge in a wholly unrelated matter .... The
chances of such a coincidence, however, appear slim in comparison to the
odds that he contributed to the judge's campaign because he expected to be
in court soon.
Id. at 463.
143. Wright, supra note 11, at 689.
144. Id. at 689-90 (citing H.R. REP. No. 227, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1981)).
145. Id. at 689 (citing Bunton v. Patterson, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (holding that "a change
from an elective system to an appointive system requires preclearance under Section 5")).
146. Id. at 689.
147. Supporters of merit selection view retention elections as a compromise with those
who feel that voters should play some role in choosing judges. The great majority of judges
win retention in routine fashion. See Susan B. Carbon, Judicial Retention Elections: Are
They Serving Their Intended Purpose?, 64 JUDICATURE 210 (1980).
148. Shapiro, supra note 127, at 1568. But see Thompson, supra note 140, at 2009 (stat-
ing that "the existence of life tenured article III judges available to protect fundamental
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value of possibly having a more politically independent judiciary capable
of making "proper" legal decisions "outweighs democracy doesn't suggest
that the latter's value is zero .... If we believe in both ideas and are
loathe to administer knockout blows to either, appointing judges and sub-
jecting them to retention elections makes some sense. Neither value
loses, or neither loses badly; both are reinforced."' 149
However, if a retention election component is included in the merit-
selection proposal, the possibility exists that minority candidates would
lose their retention election.150 Thus, some merit-selection plans may not
even achieve the stated goal of increased minority representation. Fur-
thermore, because of this potential for a lack of minority representation,
merit-selection plans which include a retention election would be subject
to suits under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.' 5 '
Another potential downside to merit-selection plans, alluded to previ-
ously, is that voters lose their right to vote for their judges. If indeed
judges are representatives, 152 which they have to be interpreted as to be
subject to the Voting Rights Act, then a merit-selection plan in essence
chooses citizens' representatives for them. Such a system seems anti-
democratic and overly paternalistic.' 53
On the other hand, "[t]o say that judges should be elected or subject to
retention elections after appointment suggests that what they do is similar
in many respects to what legislators and executives do, and that they may
be chosen on the same bases.' 54 Furthermore,
values and minority interests diminishes the necessary freedom from electoral accountabil-
ity of state court judges.").
149. Shapiro, supra note 127, at 1561.
150. Id. at 1569.
151. Id. Given the broad interpretation of the Voting Rights Act's coverage in Chisom
and Houston Lawyers' Ass'n, judicial selection systems with an election component are
unlikely to be exempted from scrutiny under Section 2. Id.
152. "A realist perspective recognizes the dual characteristics of the judiciary: the pub-
lic wants judges to be independent and impartial, but also seeks judges that are accounta-
ble to citizens and sensitive to the impact of judicial decisions on society. Although tension
exists in judicial performance of these twin roles, they are not inherently contradictory.
Both functions emanate from a concern to safeguard the integrity and authority of the
democratic political process." Saks, supra note 2, at 276. On the other hand, "[former]
Governor Buddy Roemer of Louisiana argued that representatives 'have a constituency
which numbers in the hundreds of thousands, to each of whom they owe fidelity ....
Judges have but one constituency, the blindfolded lady with the scales and sword.'" Id. at
277. "[T]hose who now contend that judges cannot be considered 'representatives' remain
wedded to a dated formalist philosophy of jurisprudence." Id. at 278. The notion that
judges do more than apply existing rules and base their decisions on the existing problems
and concerns of citizens "precludes a judicial role totally independent of 'representative'
concerns. In this sense, judges are similar to legislators and other representative officials
who act in the interests of their constituents." Id. at 279.
153. See Pearson & Castle, supra note 119, at 34 ("The practice of electing judges
originated in the Jacksonian era and is considered a part of the period's populist demo-
cratic tradition.").
154. Shapiro, supra note 127, at 1562. But see Thompson, supra note 140, at 2043.
Given the wide rejection of the notion that appellate judges merely find
"law" that is somewhere out there to be found, it is inescapable that these
judges are political actors; they are lawmakers in conjunction with adjudica-
tion, whatever jurisprudential theory is accepted. Inevitably, there is the
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[Tihe very idea of judges mirroring preferences defies coherent ex-
planation. What exactly are judges mirroring? An untutored set of
preferences concerning adjudicatory results? The preferences of in-
formed, reflective members of the community, acting as proxies for
the electorate? The preferences of an ideal community? How could
accurate mirroring be verified? If the community is substantially
fractured, what then? Should courts construct outcomes and design
clumsy opinions so as to "mirror" the variations and shadings in pub-
lic opinion - a kind of proportional representation for community
preferences? 155
In other words, "[i]f judges are to be directly responsible to the public,
then the judicial system ought to be abolished and every time an issue
comes up just have a vote on whether X should be convicted or whether
this decision should be made."'1 56
Additionally, there is not much indication that the majority of voters
truly have a desire to vote for down-ballot judicial positions. In general,
there is a lack of knowledge of the judicial system and judicial campaigns
among the public.'5 7 Far fewer votes are cast in these races, and many of
those are straight-ticket votes,158 possibly indicating a lack of knowledge
concerning individual candidates and their qualifications for office. Most
studies of voters in judicial elections indicate that a high proportion of
voters know little about the candidates for whom they vote. 159
Finally, merit-selection plans may be politically unpopular, thus failing
one of the stated goals for any proposed alternative to single-member
districts as a remedy for voting-rights challenges. Specifically, without
elections, trial lawyers would have no judicial campaigns to support finan-
cially. Trial lawyers value these campaign donations as an attempt to in-
question of why this group of political actors... [should be] exposed to less
popular electoral accountability than other actors in the political process.
Id.
155. Shapiro, supra note 127, at 1565.
156. Hon. Robert F. Stephens, Judicial Election and Appointment at the State Level:
Commentary on State Selection of Judges, 77 Ky. L.J. 741 (1989).
157. Id. at 742. As an example, a Kentucky newspaper conducted a poll in the 1980's in
which five hundred people in seven counties in the central Kentucky area were polled.
Thirty-three percent of the people in this fairly well-educated, fairly high economic level
area believed that accused criminals are presumed guilty and have to prove themselves
innocent. Id. at 743. Twenty-five percent of the people polled believed that the governor
of the state had the right to review opinions and decisions of the supreme court. Id.
158. See Solimine, supra note 137, at 72. But see Pearson & Castle, supra note 119, at
35-36 (stating that in "a 1988 Texas Primary referendum .... eighty-six percent of the
voters indicated a preference for partisan election of judges over 'an appointment process
created by the Legislature.' ").
159. Baum, supra note 120, at 647. Baum goes on to argue, however, that
improvements in the availability of information to voters could substantially
increase their knowledge about candidates for judgeships. Accordingly, one
who is dissatisfied with the quality of judgments made by voters might advo-
cate efforts to provide more information to voters rather than an abolition of
judicial elections. Further, one's conclusions about the desirability of abol-
ishing elections may depend on perceptions of the likelihood that such im-




fluence potential judges and would thus likely oppose any proposed
change to the system which included eliminating elections for judges. 16°
C. NON-PARTISAN ELECTIONS
Another possible alternative to single-member districts as a solution to
voting rights violations is the implementation of non-partisan elections.
States first enacted non-partisan election laws during the Progressive Era
in response to the perception that political party bosses and their organi-
zational machines were corrupting city governments.16' Twenty states
have non-partisan elections. 162 Such systems require candidates to obtain
a certain number of signatures in order to be listed on the ballot. 63 After
acquiring the signatures, candidates run without party affiliation:' 64
Typical nonpartisan election laws permit only the names of candi-
dates, without any party affiliation, to appear on the ballot. Gener-
ally, political parties may still, and often do, endorse and run the
campaigns of nonpartisan candidates. California voters, believing
that such participation by parties defeats many of the goals of non-
partisan systems, recently amended their state constitution to insti-
tute an "absolute" nonpartisan system: one that prohibits political
parties from endorsing, supporting or opposing candidates for non-
partisan office. This absolute nonpartisan scheme is an attempt to
make not just the form of elections, but the campaigns themselves,
nonpartisan. Since such a provision directly limits political speech
and association, it is susceptible to the challenge that it unconstitu-
tionally burdens the first amendment rights of political parties and
their members. 65
The Supreme Court has nonetheless recognized that states have a com-
pelling interest in regulating elections to ensure that the democratic pro-
160. Again, such opposition is insufficient to justify impeding progress. Nevertheless, it
remains a realistic political obstacle.
161. Nancy Northup, Local Nonpartisan Elections, Political Parties and the First
Amendment, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1677 (1987) ("Nonpartisan schemes, by limiting political
party participation in local elections, are seen as a means to a more efficient and responsive
local government."); see PHILIP L. Dunois, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH 4 (1980) ("concern
over the adverse effects of partisan politics on the quality and operation of the judiciary led
many states to replace partisan elections with . . . nonpartisan nomination and
elections ... ").
162. Banner, supra note 129, at 452.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Northup, supra note 161, at 1677-78.
The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievance." U.S.
Const. amend. I. "It has long been established that these First Amendment
freedoms are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by the
States." Northrup, supra note 161, at 1677-78 (citing Edwards v. South Caro-
lina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963)).
Although the Constitution does not expressly grant a right of association,
the Supreme Court has derived it through the First Amendment rights to
speech, petition, and assembly. The Supreme Court acknowledged this right
in NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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cess is open and fair.166 Not only does the Constitution explicitly grant
states the power to regulate the time, manner, and place of elections, but
"as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections
if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than
chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes."'1 67 Ordered, open, and
fair elections are essential to achieve the purpose of the democratic pro-
cess: the legitimate expression of the will of the electorate in the elec-
tion's outcome.168
Some commentators have suggested that political party affiliation, not
race, is the deciding factor in judicial elections.169 Indeed, the statistics in
this area are shocking. Texas is an example of the role party politics can
play in judicial elections. In 1984, Ronald Reagan won 64 percent of the
vote in Texas, and every incumbent Democratic district judge running
that year in Dallas and Houston lost.170 Republicans also won four open
district court seats in those two cities. 171
Reagan's coattails were not limited to the district courts. Four incum-
bent Democrats lost their seats on Texas' courts of appeals in 1984.172
Overall, of the thirty-five contested races statewide for appellate or dis-
trict benches in 1984, Republican candidates won thirty of them.' 73 Both
Republican and Democratic judges agree that 1984 was a clear example
of how the top of the ticket can influence down-ballot judicial races.1 74
Another example of the potential detrimental effects of partisan politics
on judicial elections is the 1994 election in Texas. In a Republican land-
166. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730, reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 926 (1974).
167. Id.
168. See id. at 732-33.
169. E.g., William Murchison, Why Morales Deserved to Lose, TEXAS LAWYER, Sept. 6,
1993, at 8:
The Democratic-inspired idea behind judicial reapportionment is to unhorse
Republican judges, replacing them with black or brown Democrats grateful
to the party establishment. The Democrats brand at-large elections as racist,
when in fact party affiliation determines the winners in these races. In coun-
ties that go Republican, Higginbotham noted, it's hardly strange that Repub-
lican judges get swept into office with the tide. It's equally unsurprising, one
might add, when Republican judges got swept backward in Democratic
counties.
Id. (commenting on the recent opinion by Justice Higginbotham in League of United Latin
American Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 878
(1994).
170. Richard Connelly, GOP's Class of 1984 Leaves Mixed Legacy, TEXAS LAWYER,




174. Connelly, supra note 170, at 36.
Judge David West of Harris County's 269th District has felt the influence
both ways: He was ousted in the 1982 Democratic sweep led by Gov. Mark
White but returned to office two years later on the Reagan landslide .... "I
got beat good in 1982, and in 1984 1 got the second-highest vote for a districtjudge in the history of Texas," West said. "TWo years after a scorching de-
feat, I went from being this goat to the great brilliant intellectual jurist I
apparently am if you believe the vote. So you can see why I'm just a bit
cynical [about partisan judicial elections]."
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slide, Harris county lost eight of its ten minority judges.175 Both Demo-
crats and Republican officials attributed the losses to straight-ticket GOP
voting.176 Thus, the lack of minority judges might be the result of parti-
san voting, not white-block voting. 177 Therefore, non-partisan elections
might increase the number of minority judges.
The potential dangers of having a judiciary selected primarily on the
basis of party affiliation are considerable. The first danger is the risk of
electing unqualified candidates. 78 In the 1984 Reagan landslide, Dallas
County, for example, lost five experienced Democratic judges, including
a 21-year incumbent, a 16-year incumbent, and a 12-year incumbent. 79
Thirty percent of the votes cast in Dallas County in 1984 were straight-
ticket Republican. 80 The Democratic judge who came closest to winning
still lost by 22,000 votes.' 8'
Non-partisan elections are instituted to prevent straight ticket voting
based on national issues unrelated to the administration of local govern-
ment.182 In other words, supporters of non-partisan elections argue, for
example, that Ronald Reagan's national campaign rhetoric had little to
do with an individual candidate's qualifications to be a judge. Conse-
quently, non-partisan elections, by separating the label of a national polit-
ical party from the judicial aspirant, serve to promote electoral decisions
made on the basis of candidate qualifications, rather than the superficial
aspect of an irrelevant political classification. "Partisanship has no place
in judicial elections. If we as citizens of this country want judges to do
what the constitution requires, we need judges who are objective, tal-
ented, fair, and nonpolitical in*the long run. 18 3
There is little indication that party affiliation is indicative of the deci-
sions a judge will make, especially at the trial-court level. "[E]vidence
indicates 'the weakness of party as an ideological predictor.' ,,184
[N]umerous empirical studies demonstrate that over time, political
affiliation does not offer a "complete explanation" for the voting be-
havior of most state court judges. That is, judges elected as... Dem-
ocrats do not always, or even consistently, vote for a "liberal" result;
175. 'Bruce Nichols, "Harris County Voters Oust 8 of 10 Minority Judges," DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Nov. 12, 1994, at Al.
176. Id.
177. Some commentators observe that racist voting and straight-ticket voting may not
be mutually exclusive. See Nichols, supra note 175, at A16.
178. See id. (quoting Anthony Champagne, a professor at the University of Texas at
Dallas and an expert on the state's judicial politics: "The effect on judicial races is that you
can get people in office who are very questionable ... and people who are not real careerjudges;" and Judge David West: "When you have a straight-ticket sweep, you're going to
elect people who don't deserve to be elected .... We won at least three seats that year
that we shouldn't have won.").
179. Connelly, supra note 170, at 36.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Northup, supra note 161, at 1679.
183. Stephens, supra note 156, at 745.
184. Connelly, supra note 170, at 37 (quoting Anthony Champagne, professor at the
University of Texas at Dallas).
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similarly, elected ... Republican judges are not guaranteed to vote
"conservatively." Many issues, or potential results, do not neatly fall
into one or the other category. Moreover, powerful institutional
constraints, such as the force of precedent, the expectation of reason-
ably principled written decisions, and the need to reach collegial de-
cisions (on the appellate level), limit the imposition of a judge's
purely personal or political values on a case.185
Non-partisan elections would de-politicize the process.'8 6 Because
party affiliation is a poor indicator of judicial ideology, there seems little
reason to force judges to choose a party label. Non-partisan elections
would de-emphasize party affiliation and shift the focus of judicial elec-
tions to the qualifications of the candidates.
Finally, unlike merit-selection systems, non-partisan elections would
preserve the voters' right to elect their judges. "When judges make com-
mon law rules, construe statutes, or interpret constitutions, they are mak-
ing policies" and in our political system based on democratic principles, it
is natural to expect that policy-makers should have some sort of mandate
from the electorate to do so, or at least in some way be held accountable
to the voters.187 For this reason, removing political labels from judicial
candidates, as opposed to removing judges from elections altogether,188
might be more politically appealing and thus easier to institute.
However, there are also numerous downsides to non-partisan elections.
First, its political appeal is called into question when one considers that
the political party benefitting from the coattails effect is unlikely to sup-
port changing the status quo, at least until the political pendulum swings
back. Thus, for example, Republicans in Texas who have benefitted from
185. Michael E. Solimine, Book Review, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 987, 991 (1989) (reviewing
G. ALAN TARR AND MARY CORNELIA ALDIS PORTER, ACTIVISM AND POLITICS ON STATE
SUPREME COURTS: STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION (1988)).
186. See Northup, supra note 161, at 1679.
Nonpartisanship is an alternative way to structure local government that re-
jects both the one-party and two-party systems. Supporters of nonpartisan-
ship envision direct representation of citizens rather than indirect
representation through parties as intermediaries. They seek to make local
government more businesslike and less political. The ultimate goal is to cre-
ate a more responsive and effective local government system.
Id.
187. Bradley C. Canon, Judicial Election and Appointment at the State Level: Commen-
tary on State Selection of Judges, 77 Ky. L.J. 747 (1989). Canon provides an excellent sum-
mary of the existing tension:
In short, we do not want judges who are spineless politicians following the
whims of every transient majority or helping to whip up the passions of the
day. But neither do we want judges whose devotion to logic or principles is
so great that they are quite disdainful of the actual consequences their deci-
sions have on society.
Id. Canon concludes that "[t]he Grail of perpetually balanced judicial accountability and
independence will never be found, but we should not abandon the search." Id. at 757.
188. A merit-selection plan with a retention-election component would, however, pre-
serve some measure of electoral accountability. Unfortunately, voters are likely to be less
informed in retention elections, where information may be scarce, than in contested races.
Baum, supra note 120, at 647.
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partisan voting have no incentive to advocate changing the system which
has brought them so much success.
Furthermore, it is uncertain that non-partisan elections would increase
the number of minority judges; the only thing that is clear is that minority.
voters tend to support Democratic candidates. Over ninety percent of
African Americans and sixty to seventy percent of Hispanics vote
Democratic. 8 9
Thus, the lack of minority representation on the bench may simply be a
product of too few African-American Republican candidates and minor-
ity voters supporting the side that tends to lose. Arguably, such a situa-
tion does not violate the Voting Rights Act. Furthermore, since there is
no tangible indication of how changing to non-partisan elections would
increase the number of minorities on the bench, such a plan offered as a
solution to voting rights violations may not pass constitutional challenges.
Given that the down-ballot judicial races are heavily influenced by the
political affiliation at the top of the ticket, if the political party label of
judges is stripped, voters will have even less on which to base their votes.
Even the most conscientious of voters is not always knowledgeable when
it comes to the judicial races at the bottom of the ballot. If voters have
even less information on which to base their vote, then the result might
actually be an increase in arbitrariness and unqualified judges.
V. CONCLUSION
From the many deficiencies associated with single-member districts, it
is clear that districting may create more problems than it solves. Further-
more, single-member districts may not be in the best interest of minority
voters. It is these voters that a remedy is intended to benefit the most.
As a theoretical proposal, cumulative voting solves many of the
problems associated with single-member districts as a potential remedy.
However, because of political practicalities, it will probably never be
implemented.
Similarly, non-partisan elections may be a good idea in their own right,
since the evidence indicates that partisan politics has a strong influence
on judicial races, even though party affiliation is a poor predictor of judi-
cial decisions. However, again for political reasons, such a plan is un-
likely to be implemented. It is also unclear how such a plan would
increase the number of minority judges.
Finally, merit selection seems to be the best method of ensuring in-
creased minority representation on the bench. Statistics show an increase
in the number of minority judges in states where merit selection has been
implemented. Also, the political costs of such a plan are less of an imped-
iment than those for the other two proposed alternatives.
Any changes in the process are going to produce political downsides.
However, assuming that the status quo is not the desired situation, a
189. Murchison, supra note 169, at 8.
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merit-selection plan seems to be the best available solution, legally and
politically, to voting rights challenges to at-large judicial elections. While
voters would lose their right to directly elect their judges, that right
should be sacrificed for the benefits such a plan would bring.
SMU LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX
The selection plans discussed above are merely sketches. Many differ-
ent forms and combinations of such plans can and have been imple-
mented. The following are examples of the selection systems being used
by the fifty states, indicating the complex nature such systems can
contain:
CALIFORNIA: Supreme court and courts of appeal justices are appointed
by the governor and confirmed by a Commission on Judicial Appoint-
ments. Judges run unopposed on non-partisan retention ballots at the
next general election after appointment. Superior court judges are
elected on a non-partisan ballot or are selected by the method described
above; judges are elected to a full term at the next general election on a
non-partisan ballot. Municipal court and justice court justices are initially
appointed by the governor and county board of supervisors, respectively,
and retain office by election on a non-partisan ballot.
FLORIDA: Supreme court and district court of appeals justices are ap-
pointed by the governor from nominees submitted by the appropriate Ju-
dicial Nominating Commission. Judges run for retention at the next
general election preceding expiration of the term. Circuit and county
court judges are elected on non-partisan ballots.
NEW YORK: All are elected on partisan ballots, except court of appeals
judges who are appointed by the governor with advice and consent of the
senate. The governor also appoints court of claims judges and designates
members of the appellate division of the supreme court. The mayor of
New York City appoints judges of criminal and family courts in the city
from a list submitted by a Judicial Nominating Commission, established
by the mayor's executive order.
TEXAS: All are elected on partisan ballots, however, the method of selec-
tion for municipal judges is determined by city charter or local
ordinance. 19o
190. Taken from WEST'S APPOINTMENT BOOK FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS, 1994 93-96
(West Publishing 1993).
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